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This paper focuses on three issues. First, it analyses the increasing inequality of wealth in 
Sweden in terms of percentile age and birth cohort differences. Second, it discusses mobility 
of wealth as a function of age, length of the transition period, the magnitude of quantile 
differences, and a time trend. The third theme is the relative importance of bequests. 
Estimates are given of their share of total net worth, and of their contribution to the inequality  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Measurement and decomposition characterize much of previous empirical research on the 
distribution of wealth. Using comparisons across nations and time and decomposition by type 
of asset and type of wealth holder we have attempted to better understand changes and cross-
sectional differences in the distribution of wealth. Usually there is a focus on the inequality of 
wealth and in particular on the wealth share of the top 1 or 5 percent. This could be motivated 
by the finding that much of the activity goes on in the extreme right tail of the wealth 
distribution and by the influence of the very rich at the national level. However, the almost 
obsessed interest in the very rich does not justify only a modest interest for the remaining 95 
percent of the population, in particular as the notorious difficulties in measuring wealth are 
particularly severe for the very rich.  
 
In Sweden two data sources have been used. One is register data from self-assessments for 
taxation purposes and from employers, banks and brokers, and another is survey data. Estate 
data have (to my knowledge) only been used by economic historians in geographically very 
limited studies. Measures of inequality depends very much on what is included in the wealth 
concept as demonstrated in Bager-Sjögren & Klevmarken (1993). In particular, they found 
that the inequality of tax assessed wealth was much higher than the inequality of a wealth 
concept based on market values and with a broader coverage. Older Swedish studies that had 
to rely on self-assessment data thus probably exaggerated inequality as compared to later 
studies based on better data. In the last decade the quality of register data from Statistics 
Sweden has increased considerably and today much speak in their favor, but to get a longer 
perspective the HUS surveys are used in this study. Comparisons with register data can be 
found in Bager-Sjögren & Klevmarken (1993, 1998). 
 
Previous Swedish estimates of the inequality of wealth (Spånt 1987) show a decline from the 
beginning of the previous century to the middle of the 1970s. The decline then came to a halt, 
Jansson &Johansson(1988). The inequality of wealth started to increase in the 1980s. 
Depending on inequality measure used the increase can be dated to the beginning, the middle 
or the end of this decade, SCB(2000). It continued to increase through the 1990s. Diagram 1 
shows the 1984, 1993 and 1998 net worth distributions as estimated from the HUS surveys. It 
demonstrates the increase in mean wealth as well as the increase in inequality that is even 
more clearly seen from Table 1 and Diagram 2. Although the estimates of the 10
th and the 90
th 
percentiles are rather uncertain the picture of a very small increase in the 10
th percentile, and a 
strong increase of the 90
th percentile, in particular during the second half of the period 1984-
98, is quite clear. Median net worth also increased more than the 10
th percentile did, but much 
less than the 90
th percentile.  
 
The Swedish changes in wealth more or less parallel those of other European countries and of 
the United States as summarized in Davis & Shorrocks(1999). One difference between 
Sweden and the United States is that the Swedish increase in inequality originated primarily 
from the extreme tails of the distribution as measured by the ratio between the 90
th and the 
10
th percentiles, while in the U.S. this ratio as well as the quartile ratio had increased, see 
Klevmarken et.al. (2000), Display 1. This finding for Sweden parallels that of Spånt(1987) 
who showed that the drop of the share of  the top 10 percent in the period 1920-1975 was 
almost all accounted for by the decline of the top 1 percent. Inequality among those below the 
top did not change much.   3 
 
The increase in inequality in the 1980s and 1990s probably has several explanations. One is 
the aging of the baby boom cohorts who in these decades approached the peak of the age-
wealth profile as predicted by the life-cycle hypothesis. Another is the increasing distrust in 
the social security system and increased private pension savings to compensate for anticipated 
cuts in compensation. A third is the deregulation of the capital markets at the end of the 1980s 
and a fourth the major tax reform in the beginning of the 1990s. Related to these changes 
there were rather dramatic changes in asset prices. 
 
The Swedish private savings rate peaked at about 12-13 percent around 1993-94 from a low 
of a few percent in the prior years. After 1993 the rate dropped back down under 5 percent in 
1998 and 1999. One explanation to the peak in the time series is the reduction of debts after 
the tax reform in 1991. Debt ratios decreased in particular for high income and wealthy 
people. The savings rate then decreased as a result of the deep recession in the first half of the 
1990s and falling real estate prices. It did not increase at the end of the recession, but 
continued to decrease reflecting a need to purchase durables, purchases that were postponed 
during the recession and which were boosted by favorable expectations about future income 
growth. 
 
The importance of changes in asset prices to explain changes in the inequality of wealth has 
been documented in several studies: Spånt(1987), Pålsson(1993), Bager-Sjögren & 
Klevmarken(1998) and SCB(2000). Changes in the real price of homes and vacation homes 
primarily influence the center part of the wealth distribution. Real estate prices have been 
rather volatile. They peaked in the beginning of the 1980s, in the beginning of the 1990s and 
then again in the beginning of 2000. The troughs in the middle of the 1980s and in the middle 
of the 1990s were about 70 percent of the peaks. Over the entire period 1975-1990 there was 
no increase in the real price of homes and vacation homes.  
 
Increases i n the prices of stocks and shares will primarily influence the right tail of the 
distribution. The increase in stock prices has been exceptional. In the period 1980 to the end 
of the 1990s the general index of the Stockholm Stock Exchange increased by a multiple of 
17. The difference in price change between the real estate market and the stock market at least 
partly explains why the increase in wealth inequality in Sweden only is a move outward of the 
extreme right tail. 
 
This study starts from the perspective of the life-cycle hypothesis and first focuses on the 
stability of age-wealth profiles by percentiles. This opens for a discussion of cohort and 
period effects on wealth. It then continues with an analysis of how the percentile mobility of 
wealth depends on the time-span of mobility, the percentile width and age. The study ends 
with an attempt to separate the life-cycle and bequest components of wealth using survey 
estimates of bequests. We do not only obtain estimates of the relative share of bequests in 
total wealth but also estimate of the contribution of bequests to both the inequality and 
mobility of wealth. 
 
2.  Data 
 
Data for this study come from the Swedish household panel surveys HUS. For a general 
description and details about survey design and variables included see the code-books 
Klevmarken & Olovsson (1993), Flood et.al. (1996) and the Internet address  
http://www.handels.gu.se/econ/econometrics/hus/husin.htm     4 
The sample frame of these surveys was limited to non-institutionalized respondents in the age 
bracket 18-74. In the panel people were, however, interviewed also after the age of 74. 
 
The household concept used in these surveys define a household to include people sharing the 
same dwelling and having meals together. Interviews were normally only conducted with the 
head and the head’s spouse. The definition of a household is tied to the head. A household 
will almost always have the same head while other members living with the head might 
change. 
 
Only one household member, normally the head and if the head was not available the head’s 
spouse, was asked questions about real estate, assets and debts. The response should be given 
to include all household members.  
 
Wealth data are available from the following waves of data collection: 1984, 1986, 1993, 
1996 and 1998. Total net worth includes the following assets: Owner occupied homes 
including condominiums, vacation homes, other real estate, savings and checking accounts, 
stocks and bonds, consumer durables, less mortgages and other debts. With the exception of 
1984, life insurance and annuities are also included. When it was important to cover a long 
time period these two types of assets were, however, excluded, while in other cases when 
1984 data were not used, they were included. Assets in the form of unincorporated business 
are always difficult to capture in wealth studies. No particular questions were asked about this 
form of wealth until the 1998 survey. It is thus not covered in this study. The share of self-
employed and employed with an unincorporated business is, however, relatively small in 
Sweden. The responses to questions about financial wealth were given in bracketed form and 
then converted into Swedish crowns using bracket midpoints. All asset data were transformed 
to constant 1993 Swedish crowns using the December CPI the year prior to the survey year. 
 
Survey data on wealth is always burdened by nonresponse. To compensate for this problem 
Rubin’s multiple imputation method was applied. Predictors used were assets with valid 
responses, average real estate prices by municipality, schooling of the head and a few 
demographic variables. Imputations were made at the sub-category level described in the 
previous paragraph and not at the total net worth level. The number of assets imputed thus 
varies from one household to another. For most assets 20-30 percent of the observations were 
imputed. In the 1980s the share of imputations was a little less than 20 percent while it 
increased to about 30 percent in 1998. 
 
Imputations were done cross-sectionally that implied that imputed observations could not be 
used to study mobility. That would have inflated the mobility measures. For this purpose only 
observations without imputations were used. The disadvantage with this strategy is that we 
have to accept a relatively high nonresponse that might be selective. In future work it might 
be possible to increase the number of usable observations and then also the precision of 
estimates by a longitudinal imputation procedure. 
 
 
3.  Age – wealth profiles 
 
The life-cycle hypothesis suggests a hump-shaped relation between age and total wealth, and 
several studies have tested this hypothesis with varying success. The problem is that the 
profile does  not always decay as quickly after retirement as predicted by the life-cycle 
hypothesis. To explain this deviation from theory it has been suggested that uncertainty about   5 
health and the need for care at the end of life and uncertainty about the length of life itself 
make people reduce their wealth less than suggested by the life-cycle hypothesis. Some 
people also want to leave bequest to their children. 
 
Table 2 gives the estimates of simultaneously estimated quantile regressions of net worth on 
age in the  form of piecewise linear splines. The corresponding age-wealth profiles are 




profiles for 1984 and 1998 respectively. The 10
th percentile has almost no hump shape while 
the median profile has a clear hump that becomes even more pronounced for the 90
th 
percentile. The peak of the 1998 profiles is around the typical retirement age of 65 as 
predicted by the life-cycle hypothesis. For 1984 the peak is not as well estimated. Although 
the estimated profiles are cross-sectional and not cohort profiles the difference in shape 
between the 10
th and the 90
th percentile might suggest that the life-cycle hypothesis is a better 
explanation of behavior for the wealthy while there is very little life-cycle savings among the 
poor. 
 
Figure 5 displays the median profiles for the three years 1984, 1993 and 1998. They do not 
show a stable relationship with age. While the first part of the profiles up until the age of 45 to 
50 is about the same, the peak becomes higher and is pushed towards a higher age in the later 
profiles. Older people have thus become wealthier. The profiles for the 10
th percentile have 
become steeper (Figure 6) that implies that the age differences among the poor have 
increased. Young people are relatively less well of in the end of the 1990s compared to the 
middle of the 1980s. Similar to the median profiles the 90
th percentile profiles peak higher and 
later in age at the end of the period. The lack of stability in the age-wealth profiles suggests 
that there are other forces than stable life-cycle savings that determine the wealth distribution. 
One alternative is that there are birth cohort differences in wealth accumulation, and another 
possibility is that there are period effects that interact with age. Unfortunately data have only 
been collected at five different time points that makes it very difficult if not impossible to 
identify and estimate any period effects. But it is possible to estimate joint birth cohort and 
age effects assuming that the age effects are stable through the whole period and that the 
cohorts can explain the differences in age-wealth profiles we have observed. The resulting 
estimates are given in Table 3. Please note that the estimated age effects are annual increases 
within each age group, while the cohort effects are to be interpreted as deviations in level 
from the level of the birth-cohorts 1940-49. Although each cohort parameter is not very 
precisely estimated there is a clear birth cohort pattern. The older cohorts had less wealth than 
the younger cohort. There is an interesting difference between the wealthy and the poor. For 
the 90
th percentile the cohort effect continuously increases with each younger cohort. Do we 
see in these numbers the young affluent dot.com generation that was able to build up a fortune 
early in life? In the 10
th percentile, however, the birth cohorts of the 1940s had more 
compared to both older and younger cohorts. Those who did not belong to the affluent 
dot.coms were thus relatively less successful. 
 
The corresponding age-wealth profiles are displayed in Figure 8. They show a rather different 
picture compared to the unadjusted age profiles presented above. There is now no hump shape 
in the profiles of the 10
th and 50
th percentile and only a weak hump can be detected in the 
profile of the 90
th percentile. With this parameterization of the model wealth increases more 
or less linearly with age and there are clear advantages to younger generations. These results   6 
do not support the life-cycle hypothesis. There would seem to be very little of life-cycle 
saving in Sweden. 
1 
 
Similar results have recently been reported from a Panel on Research Agenda and New Data 
for an Aging World (U.S. National Research Council, 2001). For the United States, The 
Netherlands, Italy and Japan this panel found strong trends across cohorts. Younger cohorts 
had considerably more household wealth than older cohorts at the same age. In the case of the 
Netherlands this was explained by the combined effect of less prevalent home ownership of 
the elderly than among the young and the rise in housing prices. 
 
What explains the Swedish cohort differences in wealth?  The cohorts of the 1940s could take 
advantage of the relatively prosperous 1960s and 70s, periods of relatively high growth not 
disturbed by periods of high unemployment. These cohort were able to get a job and to keep 
it, buy a house or a condominium and then surface on the price increases in the real estate 
market and in the stock market. Older generations had to carry on the heritage of the 
depression in the 1930s and the war-time economy in the 1940s. The results indicate a more 
divided picture for the post-war generations. Some have been lucky and inherited wealth that 
have grown in the stock market and real estate market, while others who did not get an 
equally fortunate start were hurt by periods of low income growth and high unemployment in 
the 1980s and 1990s. Probably there are also cohort differences in private pension savings. 
The g rowing awareness in the 1990s of the future problems with the social security system 
has increased savings in private pension policies. It is unknown how much of this is just a 
reallocation of already existing portfolios, but the young generations have probably generated 
new savings for this purpose.  
 
Unfortunately it has not been possible to estimate models that also include period effects as 
for instance picked up by price changes in stocks and shares and in real estate, and changes in 
labor incomes. Even with richer data than have been available for this study the identification 
of all three effects is a delicate issue. Their separation will very much depend on the model 
specification. For this reason the interpretation suggested above is only tentative and more 
definite conclusions will have to await more data. 
 
4.  Wealth mobility 
 
The concept of mobility is related to the relative position of a family in the wealth 
distribution. A move up (down) in rank will normally but not necessarily 
imply an increase (decrease) in wealth. It will depend on how the whole distribution is shifted. 
Similarly, no change in rank does not exclude an increase (or decrease) in wealth. Usually 
mobility is measured relative to the quantiles of a distribution. As the quantiles change over 
time and differ across heterogeneous groups of wealth holders and across nations a move 
from one quantile to another might imply a very different move in terms of Swedish crowns 
or dollars depending on the context.  
 
Quantile mobility in wealth is largely a result of initial heterogeneity, behavior and variable 
returns on investments. Unevenly distributed inherited tangible wealth and human capital give 
people different initial opportunities to accumulate further. There are also differences in the 
desires to postpone current for future consumption, and in the willingness to accept risks in 
exchange for higher returns. Simple differences in life-cycle stages is a fundamental cause of 
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variation and hence mobility. Much of the heterogeneity in initial w ealth and in behavior is 
best seen as random phenomena. Also events at least partly beyond individual control such as 
sickness, accidents and lottery gains add to the randomness of mobility. Finally there is the 
behavior of the macro economy, financial markets and responses to public policy that will 
contribute to the mobility of wealth. 
 
The literature on mobility was reviewed in Bager-Sjögren & Klevmarken (1998). In summary 
they noted that the position in the life-cycle was important. Except possibly for the very 
young, young and middle aged increase their wealth relatively rapidly. Marital status and 
changes in marital status contributes to mobility. Singles have a disadvantage and becoming 
divorced or widowed decreases the ranking.  Those who have a higher education and get 
managerial and similar white-collar jobs tend to increase their relative wealth position. Their 
review also found that the portfolio composition determines mobility when asset prices 
change differentially. 
 
Klevmarken et.al.(2000) compared the mobility of wealth in Sweden and the United States 
using a matching technique. Contrary to what one might have expected quantile mobility is 
higher in Sweden than in the U.S.  A quantile in the U.S is, however, wider than a Swedish 
quantile, and a fter standardization for this difference (and differences in demographic 
composition) they found that quantile mobility was about the same in the two countries. 
 
Table 4 details two transition matrices, one for a short transition 1996-98 and one for a longer 
period 1984-98.  While the former is based on more than 600 observations attrition reduced 
the sample size of the 14 year transition matrix to less than 300. A comparison of the 1998 
quintiles for the two matrices - the last third of the table - shows that the 96-98 sample has a 
longer left tail than the 84-98 sample. This might be due to attrition, but another explanation 
is that the 84-98 sample on average was older in 1998 than the 96-98 sample. Any difference 
between the two transition matrices might thus not only depend on the difference in span 
covered, but also on the difference in age. We will return to this issue below, but first note a 
few stylized characteristics of the two transition matrices. 
 
The diagonal elements are all smaller in the 84-98 matrix than in the 96-98 matrix, which 
implies that mobility increases with the span of the period covered. This is also picked up by 
Shorrocks’ mobility index. Most of the mobility takes place in the middle of the distribution. 
The probabilities to stay poor and remain rich are both relatively high. For the short transition 
period they are of the same magnitude, but the probability to stay poor decreases by about 40 
percent when the span of the period is extended from 2 years to 14 years while the probability 
to remain rich only decreases by 10 percent. Judging from these results, in the long-run it thus 
becomes easier to get out of poverty than to loose a fortune! 
 
Previous studies have shown that mobility depends on age. People in the middle age brackets 
tend to move up the distribution, while people who have retired move down the distribution, 
at least if the life-cycle hypothesis is true. Age-standardized transition matrices will, however, 
not capture these moves. They will show mobility relative to the quantiles of each age group. 
Because the quantile differences tend to increase with age, c.f. above, one might expect that 
mobility should decrease when measured in transition matrices by increasing age. Table 5 
gives Shorrocks’ measures for three age groups and two transition periods. They show a weak 
negative association with age. The number of observations in the last age group is though 
very small. In an attempt to compensate for this the 84-86 and 96-98 matrices were weighted   8 
together and the Shorrocks’ measure computed for the joint matrices. The result is given in 
the last column of the table. It only shows a mild decline with increasing age. 
 
We have found that wealth mobility depends on the length of the transition period, in 
Klevmarken et.al. (2000) most of the difference in mobility between the United States and 
Sweden was motivated with the larger quantile differences in the U.S., and finally Table 5 
above indicates that mobility might change over time. The 96-98 mobility is lower than the 
84-86 mobility. Because the HUS-panels have wealth observations from 1984, 1986, 1993, 
1996 and 1998 transition matrices can be estimated for all pair-wise combinations of these 
years. That will give 10 different transition matrices. For each matrix there is a Shorrocks 
measure that can be used in an attempt to capture the relative importance of the effects of the 
three variables on mobility. The following function was estimated, 
 
  ln(s)=ln(a)+b/x1+cln(x2)+dln(x3)+e 
 
where s is Shorrocks’ measure, x1 is the spell length, x 2 the average of the quintal differences 
Q4-Q3, Q3-Q2, Q2-Q1 in 1000 Swedish crowns, and x 3 the calendar midpoint of the spell (last 
two digits of the year with one decimal point). The OLS estimates can be found in Table 6. 
The intercept should be close to zero as the Shorrocks measure has an upper limit of 1. The 
point estimate is not zero but the standard error is so high that it is not significantly different 
from zero. The estimate of b is significantly negative that implies that s will approach its 
upper limit from below for increasing spell lengths. There is a negative time trend – mobility 
decreases – but the corresponding P-value is only 0.15. The estimate of the elasticity of the 
quintal differences is not significantly different from zero. There is thus no indication that 
higher wealth dispersion will have a negative effect on the mobility measure. It is of course 
difficult to get much mileage out of only ten observations from one country. It should be an 
interesting exercise to combine data from different countries and studies given that the wealth 
concepts were approximately comparable. 
 
Just by inspection of the transition matrices it is easy to see that every quintile can be reached 
from every other quintile and that there are no periodic or absorbing states. This implies that 
these matrices are ergodic and that there exist limiting matrices and a limiting distribution that 
is independent of the initial distribution. It turns out that all matrices have the same limiting 
matrix – a matrix with all entries equal to 0.2 – and that the limiting distribution is the same as 
the observed destination distribution – a distribution with the frequencies 0.2 for each of the 
destination quintiles. The time it takes to reach the limit depends on the m obility of the 
matrix. The higher mobility the less time to reach the limit. The transition matrices that only 
have a span of two years reach their limit in 12-14 years. The observed processes are thus 
inegalitatian in the sense that they tend to preserve the observed (destination) distribution of 
wealth, but they are also egalitarian in the sense that in the limit the probability to become 
rich or poor is the same for everyone and independent of initial wealth. This is a statement 
about the properties of the observed process and not a prediction about a future distribution of 
wealth. A simple Markov model is not likely to capture well the trajectory of a wealth 
distribution. One interpretation of these results is that there is a built in tendency in the wealth 
process to move in the direction of equal chances, but the limit is never reached because new 
chocks change the direction all the time.  
 
Until now mobility have been estimated using different quintiles in the origin and the 
destination. An alternative is to use quintiles estimated from the joint distribution of origin 
and destination. Examples are given in Table 7 for the transitions 1984-86 and 1996-98. For   9 
the latter transition there are two alternatives, one with life insurance and annuities included 
and one with these assets excluded. The 1984-86 matrix is only available without these assets. 
Mobility becomes a little higher when they are included. These matrices differ from the 
previously estimated in that they capture the general increase in wealth. Probabilities to the 
right of the main diagonal are in general higher than are those to the left of the diagonal. The 
whole distribution slides up the wealth axis. These matrices are ergodic too. The limiting 
matrices have all rows equal, but all elements are not equal. Although there is a concentration 
to the two highest quintiles, it is interesting to note that in the limit the whole distribution will 
not be concentrated to the highest quintile, more than 10 percent will end up in the first 
quintile. The limiting distributions are displayed in the last panel of Table 7.  
 
Thus, in summary, the mobility processes move in the direction to give people equal chances 
independently of whether they start out poor or wealthy, but there is no strong tendency to 
decrease the cross-sectional inequality of wealth. 
 
5.  The relative importance of bequests 
 
Blinder(1988) and Davies & Shorrocks (1999) summarize well the discussion about the 
relative importance of  bequests. The latter authors conclude that a reasonable rough estimate 
is that inheritance contributes some 35-45 percent to aggregate wealth. 
 
The 1998 wave of the HUS surveys includes questions about inheritance and gifts received 
that can be used to estimate the relative importance of these two sources of wealth in shaping 
the distribution of total net worth. Each household has been asked if they inherited and/or 
received any gifts at a value of more than 1000 Swedish crowns
2, if yes how many times, 
when and how much. For each household it is thus possible to compute the capitalized value 
of inherited wealth and of gifts using various interest rates and assumptions about 
consumption out of the amounts received. In this paper the aim is only to get a rough idea of 
the relative importance of this kind of wealth and we will only use two different alternatives: 
The sum of all amounts received without capitalization and with capitalization to the real 
interest rate of 3 percent. On average median net worth increased by 1.9 percent annually in 
the period 1984-98. In the last five years of this period real net worth increased at a higher 
annual rate, 4.1 percent. 3 percent might serve as a good compromise.  
 
For the households that received a gift or inherited Table 8 gives a few descriptive statistics of 
the distributions of inherited wealth, gifts and the sum of the two with and without 
capitalization. 30.5 percent of the respondent households had inherited, 17 percent received 
one or more gifts, 13.2 percent both inherited and got gifts, and 34.4 percent inherited or got a 
gift. Although one would have to look more closely at the timing of gifts and bequests and 
find out who the donator is before any firm conclusions can be drawn about gifts as an early 
substitute for bequests, the fact that almost all gifts go to households that also inherit suggests 
that the two should be treated as one and the same type of intergenerational transfer. The 
median capitalized sum of gifts and inherited wealth is a little more than 100 000 Swedish 
crowns and the 90
th percentile almost 800  000. Gifts are typically smaller than amounts 
inherited. The typical gift is 10 000 Swedish crowns. The reason is most certainly that 
amounts above 10 000 are due to gift tax. The median of the sum of all gifts received is about 
17 000 Swedish crowns. The  median of the sum of all inherited wealth is 75 000. These 
amounts are thus relatively small, but the distributions are heavily skewed. The corresponding 
means are 90 000 and 270 000 Swedish crowns respectively. 
                                                                 
2 Approximately 100 USD   10 
 
Table 9 displays the net worth distribution with and without inheritance and gifts. The 1998 
mean net worth in 1993 Swedish crowns was 928144. Net of inheritance and gifts without 
capitalization it was 830 740 and with capitalization 751 901 Swedish crowns. In neither case 
anything was subtracted f or consumption purposes. The shares of inherited wealth and gifts 
out of total net worth with and without capitalization thus becomes 19 and 10.5 percent. These 
numbers are low compared to the best estimates of Davies & Shorrocks (1999), but they are in 
the same range as some of the previous estimates from survey data. For instance, in the U.S. 
Panel Study of Income dynamics (PSID), it was found that only one in five households had 
received any financial inheritances as of 1984. Smith(1999) estimated that inheritances would 
account for only 13 percent of PSID 1984 wealth values, as well as 13 percent of the 
increment in wealth between 1984 and 1994. It is generally believed that survey data 
underestimate the share of bequests out of total net worth because surveys have difficulties in 
capturing households with the largest fortunes most of which are believed to originate from 
bequests. It is impossible to know without additional information on the very rich if this is the 
explanation to the comparatively low f igures in our case or if bequests are relatively less 
important in Sweden with its low wealth dispersion and high tax on bequests and gifts.
3 
 
 If most of the very large fortunes are inherited, then one would expect that the wealth 
distribution net of bequests would be more equal than the distribution including these sources 
of wealth. It is then interesting to note from Table 9 that this is not the case. Inherited wealth 
and gifts make the distribution of net worth more equal! All inequality measures in this table 
give the same result. One also finds that bequests and gifts increase the 10
th percentile by 305 
percent while they only increase the 90
th percentile by 9 percent! Again, this might be the 
result of an inability of the survey to capture the very l arge bequests, but among the 95 
percent of the population who do not belong to the very rich bequests tend to make the wealth 
distribution more equal. The explanation is that in most cases estates are split on several heirs, 
that assets are transferred from wealthy to less wealthy and that although most amounts are 
rather small, even small amounts mean relatively much to people who are not so wealthy. 
 
Finally we will investigate what bequests imply for mobility. To do so two transitions will be 
considered: 1993-98 and 1996-98. From the 1998 total net worth figures inherited wealth and 
gifts received in each of these periods were subtracted and the corresponding transition 
matrices and Shorrocks measures computed. They were then compared to the original 
matrices and measures. Table 10 summarizes the results. There is virtually no effect on 
mobility from bequests and gifts. The explanation is that in these short periods the number of 
households that receive a transfer is rather small and the amounts transferred are typically 
small too.  
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
Cross-sectional age-wealth profiles are hump shaped but they are not stable and wealth has 
become more concentrated to the elderly. The birth-cohorts included in this study have 
experienced very different opportunities in accumulating wealth. Later generations have been 
more fortunate than older generations. Among the younger generations we also see an 
increasing inequality in wealth. Some have been very successful while others have not been 
able to accumulate at all. As a matter of interpretation almost the whole hump in the cross-
sectional profiles can be attributed to differences in birth-cohorts that would imply that there 
                                                                 
3 Respondents were asked to give amounts inherited and received in the form of gifts with taxes deducted.   11 
is very little life-cycle savings in Sweden. The almost constant increase with increasing age in 
wealth net of the cohort differences would then have other explanations. 
 
Mobility primarily depends on the time-span of the transition period. The longer period, the 
higher mobility. Data also suggest that mobility was higher in the 1980s than in the 1990s. 
There is no strong relation between the width of the quantiles and quantile mobility, or 
between age and mobility. 
 
The ergodic property of the transition matrices implies that the mobility processes move in the 
direction to give people equal chances independently of whether they start out poor or 
wealthy, but mobility does not decrease the cross-sectional inequality of wealth. 
 
Our survey estimates of the relative importance of bequests suggest that this source of wealth 
contributes less than 20 percent of total net worth. Bequests do not increase the inequality of 
wealth, it rather decreases inequality. This might be a reason to reconsider the relatively high 
taxes on inherited wealth and on gifts for all but the very large bequests. Finally we found no 
significant effect of bequests on short-run mobility. 
 
A more general conclusion from this study is that in future research about wealth 
accumulation we cannot be satisfied by just analyzing mean or median behavior. Poor and 
rich behave very differently and most likely we will find different explanations to changes in 
different parts of the wealth distribution. Mobility is poorly understood and we need both to 
learn more about the measures we already have and take additional steps in the direction of 
causal modeling. Last but not least, improved data are very high on the priority list. If we 
could learn more about the nature of measurement errors in wealth data and have them in 
better control much could be gained. For instance, this could help in assessing how much 
measurement errors inflate our current mobility measures. There is also much work to be done 
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Table 1  Percentiles of networth 1984-1998 
 
Year    P10  P25  P50  P75  P90 
 
 1984  5684    167380    471908    819534   1281925 
           ( 8266)  (18871)  (30433)   (40804)   (95362) 
 
1986   32859  154065    470212      827896    1240956 
  (5815)    (15547)   (12079)    (20952)   ( 54268) 
 
1993   28009   201127    504048    946200  1541751 
          (10325)  (16227)     ( 25207)    (47791)  (67941) 
 
1996  50160    239832    568898  1039157  1642465 
   ( 9604)   (16003)    (14293)     (40657)     (65038) 
 
1998  49863    263886    616035  1122862  1796924 
        (10559)   (21964)    (16529)    (27954)   (54295) 
 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis include uncertainty from random imputations. 
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 in 1984, 1993 and 1998. 
 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
  Const.   -29   30-39   40-49   50-54   55-59   60-64   65-69   70-74   75-    
 
1984                       
P10   18823   23   4849   2779   8199   -4880   1363   -9291   -3556   5267  
   20880   3482   3119   8223   35128   36769   20815   11802   13949   39255  
P50 35414     14960   32237   15896   -5635  -18475   14680  -20860  -47980   15939  
   323728   36482   13206   10483   31843   36249   30034   33196   43197   42953  
P90 391503  36311   47501   46734  -32283  -35438   49512  -59309  -63160  -47371    
   169676   18552   21054   43127  164742  160000  114978   93284  137731  267282  
 
1993 
P10 -31965 –11675   21274   131   28779  -25311   33716  -26204   -2668   -951  
   129267  16254   7881   6511  20201  23736  31483  31465  19424   8864 
P50   2753  18889  23147  21029  62526   -46933  41696 -56699   -20059   -10278    
   428018  55497  27591  12041  17032  26578  38716  36496  34423  20082  
P90 207932 50251   55479  54034  13146   1530  23354 -15066 -114254 -21944  
   239436  29027  23949  30753 100249   118406   138672 178633   113578  52230  
 
1998 
P10 -181709 12101   6878   3117  21123  10028  -1317   7921   -21636  -3444  
    150066   16392  8325   5491  14986  21700  24124  26745  22818  11515    
P50 135203 11902   25444  11452  43776  12240  12844 -19410   -32731  -7217  
   114934  12942   8917   8492  20537  27638  29206  34146  34132  14142  
P90 594747 32106   54191  43878  70198   -31132   4473   556   -37613   -36719    
   432666  45519  21487  29639  57818  58736  88938 110634  83306  33526  
________________________________________________________________________ 
  Note: Standard errors in italic include the uncertainty originating from 
imputations. Net worth does not include private pension policies and annuities   15 
Table 3 Percentile networth by age and birth cohort 
 
    Est.  Std. 
P10 
    -29  -5741.8  12103.7  
  30-39  3020.2    9040.9   
  40-49  3813.9     8592.1 
  50-54  12365.6    32557.6 
  55-59  7709.2     33867.4 
  60-64  594.6  50586.6  
  65-69  3112.8    44158.8  
70-74  -1696.4     23851.6 
75-  4851.5    28465.8 
  -1919  -123003.1  129691.9 
1920-29  -75319.8   135499.1 
1930-39  -9337.5  60141.5 
1940-49  0.0 
  1950-59  -17159.2     61073.7  
  1960-69  -74178.7   65015.4   
  1970-79  -95661.9    116275.5 
  Const.  80575.7  123450.4 
 
P50   
      -29  20647.0     99131.2 
  30-39  23083.6  122024.6  
  40-49  16063.6   41182.5     
  50-54  35953.6     88498.6 
55-59  20453.8    101833.2 
60-64  -875.1    115498.9 
65-69  33199.9    135646.6 
70-74  -34068.6  128101.5 
75-  21876.5    49618.5 
  -1919  -505019.5   485077.3  
1920-29  -280764.2    361939.2 
1930-39  -30111.9  282559.7 
1940-49  0.0     
  1950-59  -317.5    550636.0 
  1960-69  -4086.7  554887.4 
  1970-79  86415.6   1064894.4 
  Const.  31407.6    619677.3 
 
P90 
  -29  71103.2    165861.4 
30-39  44926.9    133902.9 
40-49  106319.7    481144.5 
50-54  -32973.7  1014889.2 
55-59  46343.9    289084.8 
60-64  57751.0    464327.5 
65-69  21021.0    601248.7 
70-74  -80490.9    361801.0 
75-  36852.5    125219.8 
  -1919  -1206605.3  1440486.0 
1920-29  -596185.7    389230.0 
1930-39  -352652.3  1291123.5 
1940-49  0.0    
  1950-59  95356.3   1012422.8    
  1960-69  240303.7   1354621.7 
  1970-79  366784.5   1320605.9 
  Const.  -66934.7  2077017.1 
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                                  1998 
 Shorrocks’ mobility measure = 0.600      
Quintiles 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
1  0.669  0.244  0.055  0.024  0.008 
2  0.213  0.449  0.252  0.047  0.039 
3  0.070  0.240  0.426  0.194  0.070 




5  0.008  0.031  0.031  0.304  0.625 




         
                                   1998 
 Shorrocks’ mobility measure = 0.827 
Quintiles 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
1  0.407  0.389  0.093  0.056  0.056 
2  0.241  0.204  0.259  0.204  0.093 
3  0.204  0.185  0.222  0.222  0.167 




5  0.036  0.055  0.127  0.218  0.564 
Note: This matrix is based on 271 observations 
 
 
 Quintiles (SEK 1993 price level) 
 
  1984  1996  1998 (84)  1998 (96) 
Q1   149442    155529   208517   156161 
Q2   386643    384235   502029   390291 
Q3   641092    672125   911586   713947 
Q4   974663   1105681  1459625  1171326 
Note: The third colum gives the 1998 quintiles used for the 1984-98 transition 




Table 5. Shorrocks’ mobility measure by age 
 
Age group  1984-86  1996-98  Combined 
84-86 and 
96-98 
  -44  0.734  0.605  0.666 
45-64  0.736  0.601  0.647 
65-  0.705  0.557  0.609 
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Table 6. OLS estimates of the log of Shorrocks mobility measure as a function of spell length, quintal 
range and period. 
 
Parameter  Estimate  std  t-value  estimate  std  t-value 
ln(a)   3.707   2.492    1.49   3.382   2.364   1.43 
B  -0.438   0.156   -2.81  -0.506   0.119  -4.22 
C   0.038   0.053    0.72       
D  -0.953   0.584   -1.63  -0.800   0.524  -1.52 




Table 7 Transition matrices with common origin and destination quintiles 
 
  1996-98 without life insurance and annuities    1996-98 with life insurance and annuities 
Quintile  1  2  3  4  5    1  2  3  4  5 
1  0.65  0,25  0.08  0.01  0.01    0.63  0.26  0.08  0.01  0.01 
2  0.22  0.43  0.27  0.05  0.03    0.20  0.42  0.30  0.05  0.03 
3  0.06   0.23   0.40  0.24  0.07    0.05  0.20  0.35  0.28  0.11 
4  0.03  0.05  0.15  0.47  0.30    0.04  0.04  0.18  0.41  0.34 
5  0.02  0.02  0.05  0.22  0.68    0.02  0.02  0.03  0.26  0.67 
              Shorrocks=0.592        Shorrocks=0.627 
 
 
  1984-86 without life insurance and annuities 
Quintile  1  2  3  4  5 
1  0.67  0.15  0.13  0.02  0.02 
2  0.18  0.35  0.26  0.16  0.06 
3  0.11  0.20  0.36  0.21  0.12 
4  0.02  0.10  0.29  0.37  0.21 
5  0.00  0.03  0.11  0.19  0.67 
      Shorrocks=0.645 
 
 
  Quintiles    Limit distribution frequencies 
  1984-86 without  1996-98 
without 




Q1  134482  155502  178990  1  0.174  0.172  0.134 
Q2  434648  387906  434261  2  0.154  0.176  0.142 
Q3  653844  693918  773556  3  0.229  0.178  0.165 
Q4  977428  1141176  1241533  4  0.196  0.211  0.235 
        5  0.246  0.262  0.323 
No of obs.  472  689  689         
 
 




Table 8.  The distributions of inheritance and gifts among those who received an inheritance 




Statistic  Inheritance  Capitalize
d 
inheritance 















524             
18903      
35161 
75615 
204267   
499078 
479695    
650             
22026      
44518      
95792 
295309       
753842 
87669        
570             
3784             
8506             
17436 
43918        
119570 
173338           
851             
3894             
9423             
19471 
52178        
144318 
282753       
489      
14396      
38566      
86784 
210128       
507578 
511432       
614      
17202      
47469     
107495 
299066       
760717 
No of 
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Table 9.  The 1993 distribution of net worth compared to distributions with  




Net worth in 1993 
Swedish crowns 
Net worth less 
inheritance and gifts 
in 1993 Swedish 
crowns  
Net worth less 
inheritance and 
gifts capitalized by 






P10       
P25             
P50         






























Note: Net worth includes life insurances and annuities 
 
 
Table 10 Shorrocks mobility measure for transition matrices with and without bequests  
 
1993-98  1996-98 
With inherited wealth and gifts  0.698  0.600 
Net of bequests   0.704  0.608 
Net of capitalized bequests   0.704  0.608 
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